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THE MERRY-GO-ROUND OF YOUTH 
GANGS: THE FAILURE OF THE U.S. 
IMMIGRATION REMOVAL POLICY AND 
THE FALSE OUTSOURCING OF CRIME 
Jonah M. Temple* 
Abstract: The United States’ policy of deporting noncitizen criminals to 
their countries of origin is fueling a proliferation of gang membership 
both in Central America and in the United States. Deportation does not 
deter gang activity but instead helps to facilitate the transnational move-
ment of youth gangs. Rather than continue this failed approach, this 
Comment proposes that the United States work with Central American 
nations to develop an internationally cooperative model for regulating 
criminal gang activity. In order to strengthen its response, the United 
States must end its ineffective deportation policy. It must also impose 
sanctions and make the United States a more costly and less desirable 
place to conduct criminal activity. With insight from political economic 
theory, this Comment concludes that any new legislation must be part of 
an international crime control effort to combat the threat of gang trans-
nationalization most efficiently. 
Introduction 
 A central tenet of U.S. immigration policy is the removal and re-
turn of criminal noncitizens to their home countries.1 In 1996, broad 
legislative reform ushered in a new immigration policy in an effort to 
curb the growth of gang culture in the inner cities of the United 
States.2 Under the new laws, the United States began the large-scale 
                                                                                                                      
* Senior Articles Editor, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2010–2011). 
1 See Deportees in Latin America and the Caribbean: Hearing and Briefing Before the Subcomm. 
on the W. Hemisphere of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 4 (2007) [hereinafter 
Deportees in Latin America] (statement of Rep. Eliot L. Engel, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on 
the W. Hemisphere). 
2 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Anti-
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 431–43, 110 
Stat. 1214, 1273-81 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Jennifer M. Chacón, Whose 
Community Shield?: Examining the Removal of the “Criminal Street Gang Member,” 2007 U. Chi. 
Legal F. 317, 321–27. 
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removals of noncitizens to their countries of origin that continues to-
day.3 Not only has this deportation policy failed in its attempt to combat 
gang violence in the United States, but the sharp increase in criminals 
abroad has also led to myriad problems.4 Most striking is how the influx 
of criminals to Central America has helped spread the gang phenome-
non that began in Los Angeles to nations that are unprepared and ill-
equipped to handle such burdens.5 Specifically, the proliferation of 
Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), the largest and most violent gang in Central 
America with U.S. roots, illustrates the failure of the removal policy at 
home and abroad.6 
 MS-13 is a phenomenon born in the United States.7 The catalyst 
that created these violent gangs was a period of civil unrest and vio-
lence in El Salvador in the 1980s that caused Salvadorans to flee their 
country and settle in U.S. cities.8 A large number of these Salvadorans 
settled in lower-income urban communities—primarily in Los Ange-
les—which were already overrun with drugs and crime, forcing the in-
coming Salvadoran population to adapt to violent urban life.9 Salva-
                                                                                                                      
3 See Deportees in Latin America, supra note 1, at 4–5 (statement of Rep. Eliot L. Engel, 
Chairman, H. Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere) (“Early last decade, deportations were 
running at about 40,000 per year. Today, we are removing more than 200,000 people per 
year.”). Between 1999 and 2008, the United States deported 85,538 immigrants with criminal 
records to Central America. Office of Immigration Statistics, U.S. Dep’t. of Homeland 
Sec., 2008 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 96–102 (2009) [hereinafter 2008 Year-
book]. 
4 See Deportees in Latin America, supra note 1, at 18–19, 34–35 (statements of Rep. Greg-
ory W. Meeks, Member, H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee, Member, 
H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, and Rep. William D. Delahunt, Member, H. Subcomm. on 
the W. Hemisphere); Freddy Funes, Note, Removal of Central American Gang Members: How 
Immigration Laws Fail to Reflect Global Reality, 63 U. Miami L. Rev. 301, 310–13 (2008). 
5 See Luz E. Nagle, Criminal Gangs in Latin America: The Next Great Threat to Regional Na-
tional Security and Stability?, 14 Tex. Hisp. J.L. & Pol’y 7, 11 (2008) (explaining that the 
spread of gangs is due in part to the U.S. immigration policy that is sending tens of thou-
sands of criminal convicts to Central America’s weakest nations); Robert J. Lopez et al., 
MS-13: An International Franchise, Gang Uses Deportation to Its Advantage to Flourish in U.S., 
L.A. Times, Oct. 30, 2005, at A1 (“[A] deportation policy aimed in part at breaking up a 
Los Angeles street gang has backfired and helped spread it across Central America and 
back into other parts of the United States.”). 
6 See Laura Pedraza Fariña et al., Int’l Human Rights Clinic, Harvard Law 
Sch., No Place to Hide: Gang, State, and Clandestine Violence in El Salvador 50–
53 (2010), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/hrp/ihrc.html (follow “Pre-
vious Projects” hyperlink) [hereinafter No Place to Hide]; Geoff Thale et al., Wash. 
Office on Latin Am., Youth Gangs in Central America: Issues in Human Rights, 
Effective Policing, and Prevention 3–4 (2006). 
7 No Place to Hide, supra note 6, at 50–51. 
8 Id. 
9 See Juan J. Fogelbach, Comment, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Ley Anti Mara: El Sal-
vador’s Struggle to Reclaim Social Order, 7 San Diego Int’l L.J. 223, 252–58 (2005). 
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dorans struggled to assimilate into the unwelcoming communities and, 
to protect themselves, they formed gangs such as MS-13.10 
 The 1996 U.S. immigration reform soon followed, spurring mass 
deportations of MS-13 members that increased the gang’s activities and 
contributed to its transnationalization.11 The first wave of deported MS-
13 gang members arrived in Central America in the late 1990s.12 From 
there, MS-13 began to expand into an international gang undefined by 
national borders.13 Thus, U.S. removal has done little to contain MS-13 
and gangs like it.14 Instead, gang membership has grown in recent years 
and expanded across North America.15 
 It is the removal policy’s inability to combat gang violence effec-
tively within the United States, however, that is perhaps the policy’s big-
gest failure.16 This Comment focuses on the failings of noncitizen re-
moval in the United States.17 Part I provides an overview of the history, 
growth, and current organization of MS-13. It also explains U.S. removal 
procedures and summarizes the Central American response to the in-
crease in criminal removals. Part II shows how the removal policy has 
failed to reduce gang activity in the United States. Part III uses political 
economic theory to better understand the root of the failure of the pol-
icy.18 It then presents the idea that the policy of removing criminals 
falsely suggests that our nation removes crime to other countries, while 
in reality this policy insources crime by encouraging gang members to 
conduct profitable criminal activity in the United States.19 Finally, the 
                                                                                                                      
10 No Place to Hide, supra note 6, at 50–51; Fogelbach, supra note 9, at 226, 229–30. 
11 See No Place to Hide, supra note 6, at 50–51. 
12 Id. 
13 See id. at 51–53. 
14 See Jennifer M. Chacón, Commentary, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, 
Crime Control and National Security, 39 Conn. L. Rev. 1827, 1888 n.337 (2007). 
15 See Thale et al., supra note 6, at 2; Lopez et al., supra note 5. MS-13 has offshoots in 
at least thirty-three states. See Chris Kraul et al., MS-13: An International Franchise, L.A. Vio-
lence Crosses the Line, L.A. Times, May 15, 2005, at A1. 
16 See Chacón, supra note 14, at 1878–79 (“[A]s deportation is on the rise, violent 
crime is increasing, not decreasing.”). 
17 See MS-13, and Counting: Gang Activity in Northern Virginia: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on Gov’t Reform, 109th Cong. 78 (2006) [hereinafter MS-13, and Counting] (testimony of 
Diego G. Rodriguez, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Washington Field Office, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation); Funes, supra note 4, at 310–13. 
18 See infra Part III. See generally Tomer Broude & Doron Teichman, Outsourcing and In-
sourcing Crime: The Political Economy of Globalized Criminal Activity, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 795, 807–
15 (2009) (presenting an economic model theorizing that criminals travel to areas where 
sanctions are weakest). 
19 See infra Part III. See generally Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 807–15 (explain-
ing that criminal activity will shift to where its expected payoff is most profitable). 
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Comment concludes by suggesting the United States should work with 
other nations to create international crime control regulations. 
I. The U.S. Removal Policy, the Central American Response,  
and the Growth of International Gangs 
A. U.S. Removal Policy 
 In the 1990s, the United States experienced an increase in Central 
American youth gang membership.20 Partially in response to problems 
related to crime and illegal immigration, the United States began to 
discuss immigration reform.21 The resulting change in policy and law 
led to a sharp increase in the number of criminals deported to El Sal-
vador and other Central American countries.22 Specifically, the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA or 
“Act”) targeted criminal noncitizens for deportation.23 The IIRIRA ex-
panded crime-related removal grounds for noncitizens, permitting de-
portation based on lesser violations than previous policy allowed.24 For 
example, the Act provided that any noncitizens convicted of crimes 
with a sentence of one year or longer be eligible for deportation after 
their completed sentence.25 By expanding the categories under which 
immigrants could be removed on criminal grounds, the IIRIRA led to 
thousands of deportations to Central American nations.26 
                                                                                                                      
20 No Place to Hide, supra note 6, at 50–51; Fogelbach, supra note 9, at 226, 229–30. 
21 See Proposals for Immigration Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103rd 
Cong. 14–17 (1994) [hereinafter Proposals for Immigration Reform] (statements of Sen. Rich-
ard H. Bryan and Sen. William V. Roth, Jr.); Chacón, supra note 2, at 321–27; Funes, supra 
note 4, at 301–02. 
22 Harold Sibaja et al., U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev. Bureau for Latin Am. & the Carib-
bean, Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment Annex 1: El Salvador Profile, in Central 
America and Mexico Gang Assessment 41, 45 (2006). 
23 See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered sections of 
8 U.S.C.); Thale et al., supra note 6, at 4. 
24 See IIRIRA § 321, 110 Stat. at 3009-627 to -628 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); 
Thale et al., supra note 6, at 4. 
25 See IIRIRA § 321; Funes, supra note 4, at 306–07. 
26 See No Place to Hide, supra note 6, at 51–53. Between 1993 and 1998 the United 
States removed, on average, 1201 noncitizens to El Salvador on criminal grounds per year. 
See U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 1998 Statistical 
Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service 221–25 (2000). Between 
2003 and 2008, the average number of criminal removals to El Salvador increased to 3480. 
See 2008 Yearbook, supra note 3. “In [fiscal year 2008], nearly 21,000 Salvadorans were 
deported from the United States, 27% on criminal grounds.” Clare Ribando Seelke & 
Peter J. Meyer, Cong. Research Serv., RS 21,655, El Salvador: Political, Economic, 
and Social Conditions and U.S. Relations 7 (2009). 
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 The nations that receive noncitizen criminals experience numer-
ous problems that are exacerbated by a lack of information sharing and 
inadequate notice from the United States.27 Typically, when an immi-
grant is removed from the United States and returned to his country of 
origin, that country receives notice of his grounds for removal and his 
date of arrival.28 The current notification process, however, requires 
receiving countries be provided only three days notice before a depor-
tation.29 Additionally, notification procedures require only minimal in-
formation sharing between countries.30 This lack of information crip-
ples receiving nations’ efforts to monitor incoming gang members and 
contain gang violence.31 While communication regarding removals has 
improved, some countries still do not receive any information about 
whether returned nationals belong to a gang.32 Furthermore, while re-
ceiving countries are given information regarding the specific criminal 
offense causing deportation, the United States does not regularly pro-
vide full criminal records.33 
                                                                                                                      
27 See Sibaja et al., supra note 22, at 53 (noting general agreement that the “perceived 
lack of sharing information among countries about deportees with criminal records . . . 
[has] exacerbated the problem”); Funes, supra note 4, at 310–13 (stating that Central 
American nations are overwhelmed by the removals that are causing increased poverty and 
crime, overwhelming prison systems, and weakening legal infrastructures). 
28 See Deportees in Latin America, supra note 1, at 19 (testimony of Gary Mead, Assistant 
Director for Management, Office of Detention & Removal Operations, United States De-
partment of Homeland Security). 
29 See Partnership for Prosperity and Security in the Caribbean art. II, § 9, May 10, 
1997, 36 I.L.M. 792, 908; Deportees in Latin America, supra note 1, at 11–13, 75 (testimony of 
Gary Mead, Assistant Director for Management, Office of Detention & Removal Opera-
tions, United States Department of Homeland Security). 
30 See Violence in Central America: Briefing and Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the W. Hemi-
sphere of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 22 (2007) [hereinafter Violence in Cen-
tral America] (testimony of Roberto Flores Bermudez, Ambassador to Honduras). 
31 See id. at 22–25; Sibaja et al., supra note 22, at 53. 
32 See Violence in Central America, supra note 30, at 22–25 (testimony of Roberto Flores 
Bermudez, Ambassador to Honduras) (noting that the United States deported 90,000 Hon-
durans in 2006 but provided no information concerning whether those deportees were 
members of gangs). 
33 See Deportees in Latin America, supra note 1, at 24 (testimony of Gary Mead, Assistant 
Director for Management, Office of Detention & Removal Operations, United States De-
partment of Homeland Security) (explaining that the United States does not provide re-
ceiving nations with the entire criminal history of deportees). For example, if a hardened 
criminal is deported for committing a minor offense, but has previously committed more 
serious crimes, the United States will only provide the receiving nation with information 
regarding the minor criminal charge that led to the deportation. See id. at 25–26. 
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B. Cycle, Expansion, and the Central American Response 
 This policy of removal and lack of notice has led to an “unending 
chain” of gang members being removed to Central America and then 
returning to the United States.34 This chain of movement—initiated by 
removal from the United States—has allowed MS-13 to expand into an 
international gang.35 Additionally, gang members deported back to El 
Salvador actively recruit new gang members at home, leading to the 
expansion of U.S. gang culture abroad.36 In turn, gang members fre-
quently return to the United States illegally and spread the gang into 
new areas.37 The cycle of immigration and deportation increases the 
size and geographic reach of MS-13 and gangs like it, leading to sys-
tematic problems in both the United States and in Central America.38 
 The movement of deported gang members back into the United 
States may be driven in part by the Central American response that has 
increased the cost of gang activity in the region.39 The large number of 
well-organized and criminally sophisticated gang members deported to 
Central America puts significant burdens on “already weak criminal 
                                                                                                                      
34 See Gangs and Crime in Latin America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere 
of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 109th Cong. 3–5 (2005) [hereinafter Gangs and Crime in 
Latin America] (statement of Rep. Dan Burton, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on the W. Hemi-
sphere); Lopez et al., supra note 5 (quoting Rodrigo Avila, El Salvador’s Vice Minister of 
Security). This free movement across national borders can be attributed to a multitude of 
factors including porous border security and the minimal deterrent effect of deportations. 
See Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra, at 3. 
35 See Sibaja et al., supra note 22, at 45; see also Lopez et al., supra note 5. Estimates of 
gang membership in Central America are currently as high as 300,000 members. See Vio-
lence in Central America, supra note 30, at 2 (statement of José Guillermo Castillo Villacorta, 
Ambassador of Guatemala to the United States). El Salvador has become a centralized hub 
for rapidly growing transnational gangs. See Lopez et al., supra note 5 (describing El Salva-
dor as a “pivot point” in the spread of MS-13 to the United States). 
36 See Lopez et al., supra note 5. El Salvador’s Vice Minister of Security, Rodrigo Avila, 
has characterized the cycle of removal and return as a “merry-go-round.” See id. 
37 See id. (“[F]or a sizable number of MS-13 members, deportation is little more than a 
taxpayer-financed visit with friends and family before returning north.”); see also Gangs and 
Crime in Latin America, supra note 34, at 3 (statement of Rep. Dan Burton, Chairman, H. 
Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere) (“[W]e know that gang members who are arrested in 
the United States and deported are making their way back into the United States, and by 
the same token influencing and expanding their recruitment of new members in Mexico 
and Central America along the way.”). 
38 See Sibaja et al., supra note 22, at 45–46; Lopez et al., supra note 5. 
39 See Thale et al., supra note 6, at 10–11 (describing the harsh police methods used 
in El Salvador to regulate gang violence); Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 809, 817 
(giving several examples of how increased regulations will drive criminals to other less 
regulated localities); see also Funes, supra note 4, at 329–30 (suggesting that rising crime 
rates and diminishing economic opportunities in Central America are creating an incen-
tive for youth gang members to flee to the United States). 
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justice systems.”40 Crime and violence rates in the region have increased 
dramatically and are among the highest in the world, largely due to 
gang-related violence.41 This sharp increase in crime, caused in part by 
the forced return of thousands of criminals from the United States, has 
destabilized the region because Central American nations face wide-
spread poverty that makes it difficult to stem the steady wave of crime.42 
 In response to the return of gang members from the United States, 
Central American governments have enacted regulatory schemes which 
increase the cost of criminal activity, promoting the movement of de-
ported gang members back into the United States.43 The receiving 
countries have focused their response efforts on strengthening law en-
forcement and toughening anti-gang laws.44 Their inability to cope with 
the surge in returning criminals, however, has caused many govern-
ments to overreact in response, enacting mano dura, or “firm hand,” leg-
islation that focuses on repressive and discriminatory enforcement poli-
cies.45 These responses too often sacrifice citizens’ civil liberties and, in 
                                                                                                                      
40 See Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 34, at 13 (prepared statement of 
Adolfo A. Franco, Assistant Administrator, Bureau of Latin America and the Caribbean, 
United States Agency for International Development). The explosive return of deported 
noncitizen criminals contributed directly to the growth of gangs, primarily in El Salvador, 
Honduras, and Guatemala. See Thale et al., supra note 6, at 4; see also Violence in Central 
America, supra note 30, at 13 (testimony of Roberto Flores Bermudez, Ambassador to Hon-
duras) (placing partial blame for the growth in gangs on the deportation of thousands of 
“active gang members” from the United States to Honduras). 
41 See Seelke & Meyer, supra note 26, at 3–4; Sibaja et al., supra note 22, at 44. 
42 See Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 34, at 11–14 (prepared statement of 
Adolfo A. Franco, Assistant Administrator, Bureau of Latin America and the Caribbean, 
United States Agency for International Development); Id. at 2 (statement of Rep. Dan 
Burton, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere) (“[H]igh crime rates destabilize 
Latin American society by undermining support for democratic institutions . . . , by inhibit-
ing economic development . . . , [and] by discouraging people’s participation in commu-
nity activities.”). 
43 See No Place to Hide, supra note 6, at 107–166; Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, 
at 814–15. 
44 Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 34, at 12 (prepared statement of Adolfo 
A. Franco, Assistant Administrator, Bureau of Latin America and the Caribbean, United 
States Agency for International Development). 
45 See Lainie Reisman, Breaking the Vicious Cycle: Responding to Central American Youth 
Gang Violence, 26 SAIS Rev. Int’l Aff. 147, 148 (2006) (noting that anti-gang initiatives in 
El Salvador and Honduras are controversial because of their connection to increased hu-
man rights and due process violations). Mano dura policing strategies include “massive 
detentions of young people for the crime of gang membership, relaxed evidentiary stan-
dards, and harsh prison sentences.” Thale et al., supra note 6, at 3. For example, the first 
year after the mano dura policies were implemented in El Salvador, “19,275 people were 
detained by police on the charge of belonging to a gang,” and ninety-one percent of those 
detained were eventually released because of a lack of evidence. Id. at 11. Growing public 
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turn, weaken the country’s democratic ideals.46 Thus, the U.S. removal 
policy has caused shifts in law enforcement practices that compromise 
individual rights in the name of combating the growing youth gang 
problem.47 
 Moreover, these mano dura approaches have proven highly ineffec-
tive.48 Strong-arm tactics have only strengthened the gangs by causing 
them to unify in response to the harsh laws and limits on civil liber-
ties.49 Gangs have simply adapted, increasing coordination and becom-
ing more organized.50 With over 39,000 gang members in El Salvador, 
                                                                                                                      
support for and acceptance of such tactics is creating a climate where these discriminatory 
practices are tolerated. No Place to Hide, supra note 6, at 133–34. 
46 See Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 34, at 11–14 (prepared statement of 
Adolfo A. Franco, Assistant Administrator, Bureau of Latin America and the Caribbean, 
United States Agency for International Development); No Place to Hide, supra note 6, at 
132–35. 
47 See Chacón, supra note 2, at 352–56. This trend towards repressive enforcement can 
also be seen in the United States. See id. at 337–45. Federal task forces created to identify 
and deport gang members use stereotyping and profiling to identify gang criminal sus-
pects. See id. at 337. While impermissible in other forms of law enforcement, racial profil-
ing remains a significant tool used in federal investigations and identifications of gang 
criminals. See id. at 337–45. 
48 See Thale et al., supra note 6, at 5 (“[T]hese mano dura responses to youth gang vi-
olence have been ineffective in controlling the problem.”); see also Gangs and Crime in Latin 
America, supra note 34, at 67 (statement of Manuel Orozco, Senior Associate, Inter-
American Dialogue). Since the mano dura plan was established in 2003, there has been an 
increase in murder and gang-related crimes in El Salvador. See Seelke & Meyer, supra note 
26, at 3–4. 
49 See No Place to Hide, supra note 6, at 56–71 (“[M]ost experts attribute the organ-
izational evolution and consolidation of the two major gangs largely to the Salvadoran 
government’s law enforcement crackdowns of the past several years.”). 
50 See Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 34, at 1 (statement of Rep. Dan Bur-
ton, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere); No Place to Hide, supra note 6, at 
56–67. For example, in El Salvador, MS-13 is divided into over three hundred sub-groups 
known as clikas that communicate and coordinate with one another. Sibaja et al., supra 
note 22, at 45. The gangs have vertical hierarchies with national leaders. See id. at 45–46. 
Salvadoran prisons have also become centers of growth for MS-13, with criminal enter-
prises coordinated within the prisons. See id. at 52 (“Salvadoran officials indicate that about 
60 percent of the gang members in prison are U.S. deportees or are facing criminal 
charges in the United States.”). There is also evidence of communication between cells in 
the United States and cells in El Salvador. See Lopez et al., supra note 5 (noting that gang 
members in the Ciudad Barrios prison in El Salvador frequently communicate with Salva-
doran branches of the gang and their extensions in the United States); see also Sibaja et al., 
supra note 22, at 47 (“Members have . . . sophisticated communication networks between 
prisons and the street, using coded language and paper messages folded in a precise man-
ner, which is also coded.”). Furthermore, the types of criminal activity in which Central 
American and U.S. youth gangs engage have begun to resemble organized crime groups. 
See No Place to Hide, supra note 6, at 217–18; Sibaja et al., supra note 22, at 46–47. Par-
ticularly in the United States, MS-13 currently engages in extortion, immigrant smuggling, 
and racketeering. See Lopez et al., supra note 5. For example, nineteen MS-13 members in 
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MS-13 is currently a “fluid” and “complex” organization.51 Gang mem-
bership continues to expand, with members also participating in more 
violent crimes.52 
 The mano dura policies are quick-fix responses that do not address 
root causes.53 Rather, the hard-line approach to gang proliferation has 
inadvertently legitimized the use of force and fostered a culture of vio-
lence, furthering the unrest and insecurity of the region.54 Mano dura 
policies have made Central America an undesirable and less profitable 
region to conduct criminal gang activity.55 
II. The Failure of the U.S. Removal Policy 
 The current U.S. removal policy is not an effective domestic crime 
control measure.56 Instead of reducing gang activity, the U.S. removal 
policy has contributed to the global growth of youth gangs such as MS-
13.57 The legislative reforms expanding noncitizen criminal removals 
were enacted in part as crime control initiatives.58 It is clear, however, 
that the approach is not working.59 In fact, the policy has increased 
                                                                                                                      
Maryland were indicted in 2005 on racketeering charges and accused of participating in 
an organized crime group that had been involved in multiple murders, conspiracy to 
commit kidnapping, robbery, and obstruction of justice. See id. 
51 No Place to Hide, supra note 6, at 56–57. 
52 See Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 34, at 61 (prepared statement of Ma-
nuel Orozco, Senior Associate, Inter-American Dialogue); see also Thale et al., supra note 6, 
at 4 (noting that immigration policies contributed to the international growth of gangs). 
53 See Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 34, at 62 (prepared statement of 
Manuel Orozco, Senior Associate, Inter-American Dialogue). 
54 See id. at 60–62; No Place to Hide, supra note 6, at 200–17, 164–66. 
55 See No Place to Hide, supra note 6, at 107–66 (describing mano dura tactics which 
target youths and deportees in particular); Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 814–15. 
But see Sibaja et al., supra note 22, at 48 (noting that gang violence has caused people to 
leave El Salvador “in search of a more stable environment, taking their economic potential 
with them”). 
56 See Deportees in Latin America, supra note 1, 34–35 (statements of Rep. Sheila Jackson 
Lee, Member, H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, and Rep. William D. Delahunt, Member, H. 
Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere). 
57 See id. 
58 IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C.); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
§§ 431–43, 110 Stat. 1214, 1273-81 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Chacón, 
supra note 2, at 321–27. 
59 See Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 34, at 3 (statement of Rep. Dan Bur-
ton, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere) (describing the failures of the cur-
rent immigration policy and suggesting that the United States rethink what it does with 
noncitizen gang members); Kraul et al., supra note 15 (noting that the “decade long cam-
paign” to deport gang members led to the spread of MS-13 across Central America). 
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crime by furthering the “transnationalization” of gangs and the prolif-
eration of gang activity across the United States.60 
 The major motivation driving the increase in noncitizen removal 
was law enforcement and crime control.61 Congress’s intent was to fight 
crime and illegal immigration in the United States and to address the 
problems that noncitizens pose to the justice system.62 In theory, in-
creasing the deportation of criminal noncitizens would increase the 
public safety of U.S. citizens.63 In part, the immigration reforms were 
enacted with the intent of removing criminal noncitizens in an effort to 
curb gang activity.64 
 In the first year following the enactment of the 1996 immigration 
legislation, deportations almost doubled.65 The increase in removals 
had some initial success in combating gang problems.66 After a brief 
decline, however, gang activity quickly began a steady growth that con-
tinues today, a clear indication the policy was a quick-fix solution, short-
sighted in its potential for success and its consequences.67 
                                                                                                                      
60 See Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 34, at 3 (statement of Rep. Dan Bur-
ton, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere) (explaining that deported gang 
members frequently return to the United States while “influencing and expanding their 
recruitment of new members in Mexico and Central America along the way”); Lopez et al., 
supra note 5. 
61 See Proposals for Immigration Reform, supra note 21, at 15–17 (statement of Sen. Wil-
liam V. Roth, Jr.) (arguing for the need for immigration reform because current law is too 
complex and unenforceable and noting that only four percent of the total number of 
criminal aliens in the United States were deported in 1993); see also Chacón, supra note 14, 
at 1831 (“Discussions about the removal of non-citizens have been treated as ‘national 
security’ issues, when in fact the driving motivation is basic criminal law enforcement.”). 
62 See Proposals for Immigration Reform, supra note 21, at 15–17 (statement of Sen. Wil-
liam V. Roth, Jr.) (“My legislation addresses the serious problem of criminal aliens by sim-
plifying, streamlining, and strengthening the deportation process for criminal aliens.”). 
63 See id. 
64 See id. at 26–35 (prepared statement and testimony of Janet Reno, Att’y Gen. of the 
United States) (advocating for stronger regulations allowing for the deportation of crimi-
nal noncitizens). 
65 See Chacón, supra note 2, at 326. In 1997, 34,000 noncitizens were removed on the 
basis of criminal violations, and that number jumped to 61,000 in 1998. Id. 
66 See Arlen Egley, Jr., Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 
U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, National Youth Gang Survey Trends From 1996 to 2000, at 1 
(2002). In 1996, fifty-three percent of jurisdictions had gang problems, while in 2000 only 
forty percent of jurisdictions reported gang problems. See id. 
67 See Arlen Egley, Jr. & Christina E. O’Donnell, Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Highlights of the 2007 National 
Youth Gang Survey 1 (2009). Between 1999 and 2002, gang crime increased fifty percent. 
See Immigration and the Alien Gang Epidemic: Problems & Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Immigration, Border Sec. and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 13, 29–39 
(2005) [hereinafter Immigration and the Alien Gang Epidemic] (testimony and prepared state-
ment of Heather Mac Donald, Senior Fellow, the Manhattan Institute). The number of juris-
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 While overall crime rates in the United States have decreased since 
1996, gang-related crime continues to increase steadily.68 Moreover, the 
increase in gang membership does not show signs of slowing.69 In par-
ticular, the first decade of the twenty-first century saw a “dramatic in-
crease in the number and size of transnational street gangs.”70 As of 
2006, the Federal Bureau of Investigation estimated that there were 
38,000 MS-13 gang members in the United States.71 
 The failure of the U.S. removal policy is also evident in the coun-
try’s growing prison population.72 In part, Congress intended the 1996 
reforms to reduce the number of criminal noncitizens in the prison 
population.73 During debates on the immigration policy, members of 
Congress noted that in 1994, criminal aliens accounted for twenty-five 
percent of the federal prison population, and that there were 58,000 
                                                                                                                      
dictions reporting gang problems increased by twenty-five percent between 2002 and 2007. 
See Egley & O’Donnell, supra, at 2. During the same period, there was a twenty-five percent 
increase in the number of active gangs in the United States and a 7.7% increase in gang 
members. See id. By 2008, fifty-eight percent of state and local law enforcement agencies re-
ported criminal gangs active in their jurisdiction, a higher percentage than before large-scale 
removal began. Nat’l Gang Intelligence Ctr., National Gang Threat Assessment 
2009, at 5 (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs32/32146/32146p.pdf. [he-
reinafter Threat Assessment 2009]. 
68 See Immigration and the Alien Gang Epidemic, supra note 67, at 13 (testimony of Heath-
er Mac Donald, Senior Fellow, the Manhattan Institute) (noting that gang crime is “ex-
ploding nationally”); Chacón, supra note 14, at 1878 n.278 (noting that there is no empiri-
cal evidence to support a link between an increase in deportation and decrease in crime). 
Additionally, violent crime has increased. See Chacón, supra note 14, at 1878 n.278. The 
percentage of both homicides and firearm homicides committed by gang members in-
creased from 1993 to 2003. See Erika Harrell, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Dep’t. 
of Justice, Violence By Gang Members, 1993–2003, at 2 (2005). 
69 See Egley & O’Donnell, supra note 67, at 1–2. There were an “estimated 788,000 
gang members and 27,000 gangs . . . active in the United States in 2007.” See id. By Sep-
tember 2008, the estimate had risen to approximately one million gang members, an in-
crease of twenty-one percent since 2007. See id.; Threat Assessment 2009, supra note 67, 
at iii. “Gangs were criminally active within all 50 states and the District of Columbia as of 
September 2008.” See Threat Assessment 2009, supra note 67, at iii. 
70 See MS-13, and Counting, supra note 17, at 78 (statement of James Spero, Acting Assis-
tant Special Agent in Charge, United States Immigrations and Customs Enforcement). 
71 See Thale et al., supra note 6, at 3. This number also includes members of Calle 18, 
a gang closely related to MS-13. See id. 
72 Proposals for Immigration Reform, supra note 21, at 52 (testimony of Sen. Diane Fein-
stein); see William J. Sabol & Heather Couture, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. 
Dep’t. of Justice, Prison Inmates at Midyear 2007, at 8 (2008). 
73 See Proposals for Immigration Reform, supra note 21, at 52 (testimony of Sen. Diane 
Feinstein) (advocating for improvements to law allowing transfer of illegal aliens from U.S. 
prisons to prisons in their own country). 
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noncitizen prisoners in U.S. prisons.74 Yet, in 2007, there were 96,707 
noncitizen criminals in U.S. prisons, an increase of over thirty-eight 
percent since 1994.75 
 Beyond increasing the gang population, the removal policy is not 
an effective means of deterring or preventing criminal noncitizens 
from returning to the United States after deportation.76 The United 
States remains a desirable place for gang activity because deportation 
does not increase the cost of conducting crime.77 As a result, gang 
members freely reenter the country and reoffend without conse-
quence.78 This movement of criminal gang members across national 
borders, initiated by the U.S. removal policy, has played a “key role in 
the transnationalization” of gangs such as MS-13.79 
 The frequent movement of gang members between the United 
States and Central America has strengthened the connections and in-
fluences between the gangs in each country.80 Newly organized cells 
from El Salvador and other Central American nations are returning to 
                                                                                                                      
74 See id. at 16, 52 (testimony of Sen. William V. Roth and Sen. Diane Feinstein) 
(“[A]nywhere from 13,000 to 15,000 illegal aliens are serving time in California State pris-
on today, returning just a few hundred aliens a year is just a drop in the bucket.”). 
75 Sabol & Couture, supra note 72, at 8; see also Proposals for Immigration Reform, supra 
note 21, at 52 (testimony of Sen. Diane Feinstein). 
76 See Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 34, at 3 (statement of Rep. Dan Burton, 
Chairman, H. Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere); Chacón, supra note 14, at 1873 (“[T]here 
is no reason to believe that removal will be an effective security tool.”); Lopez et al., supra 
note 5. 
77 See Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 34, at 3 (statement of Rep. Dan Bur-
ton, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere); Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, 
at 807; Chacón, supra note 14, at 1873; Lopez et al., supra note 5. 
78 See Deportees in Latin America, supra note 1, at 38 (statement of Annemarie Barnes, 
Chief Technical Director, Ministry of National Security, Jamaica) (“While deportation may 
solve a few problems within the deporting country, the removal of criminal offenders to 
another geographical location does not protect the United States from further criminal 
actions by those persons.”); id. at 58 (statement of Marsha L. Garst, Commonwealth’s At-
torney, Rockingham County, Virginia) (“[C]riminal aliens are reentering our community 
and reoffending.”); Nagle, supra note 5, at 11–13, 16; Reisman, supra note 45, at 149 (not-
ing that it is common for deported gang members to return to the United States “within a 
matter of months”); Lopez et al., supra note 5. 
79 See Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 34, at 17 (testimony of Chris Sweck-
er, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigation Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation) 
(“[D]eportation of MS-13 and [Calle] 18 Street gang members from the United States to 
their countries of origin is partially responsible for the growth of these gangs in Central 
America.”); Thale et al., supra note 6, at 4; Nagle, supra note 5, at 11–13, 16. 
80 See Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 34, at 3 (statement of Rep. Dan Bur-
ton, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere); No Place to Hide, supra note 6, at 
51–53; Reisman, supra note 45, at 149. 
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establish cliques and strongholds throughout the United States.81 In 
particular, their expansion to smaller U.S. communities that lack ade-
quate resources has allowed gangs to increase their influence and reve-
nue, recruit new members, and grow as criminal enterprises.82 Many 
deported gang members simply return to their home country, establish 
bonds with other gang members, and then reenter their U.S. commu-
nities.83 Thus, the overall increase in gang members and the spread of 
                                                                                                                      
81 See Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 34, at 40–41, 44 (testimony of Ste-
phen C. Johnson, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America, the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom 
Davis Institute for International Studies, the Heritage Foundation) (“[I]ncreasing migrant 
flows over porous borders, deportations, as well as improved transportation and communi-
cation have helped transnational gangs grow in North America.”); Lopez et al., supra note 
5. A prominent example of gang growth is the surge of MS-13 gang members into the 
Washington, D.C. metropolitan area and surrounding communities of northern Virginia 
and Maryland. See MS-13, and Counting, supra note 17, at 92–94 (testimony of Diego G. 
Rodriguez, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Washington Field Office, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation). MS-13 gang members from Los Angeles and El Salvador have traveled to 
the northern Virginia and Washington, D.C. area in an effort to recruit members and co-
ordinate the creation of new cells. See id. at 89; Lopez et al., supra note 5 (explaining how a 
local MS-13 clique in El Salvador, known as the Marineros, sent members to the Washing-
ton, D.C. area to open new cells). MS-13 began by establishing independent cliques with 
regional leaders exercising influence over them and today, MS-13 is one of the fastest grow-
ing and the most violent gang in the region. See MS-13, and Counting, supra note 17, at 93–
94, 95 (testimony of Diego G. Rodriguez, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Washington 
Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation). 
82 See Deportees in Latin America, supra note 1, at 59 (statement of Marsha L. Garst, 
Commonwealth’s Attorney, Rockingham County, Virginia); Threat Assessment 2009, 
supra note 67, at iii (“[G]ang members are increasingly migrating from urban to suburban 
areas and are responsible for a growing percentage of crime and violence in many com-
munities.”); see also Egley & O’Donnell, supra note 67, at 2 (noting that the number of 
gang-problem jurisdictions in rural counties increased by nearly twenty-five percent be-
tween 2002 and 2007). In some communities, “criminal gangs commit as much as 80 per-
cent of the crime.” See Threat Assessment 2009, supra note 67, at iii. Local law enforce-
ment for communities experiencing an increase in criminal gangs have found it difficult to 
combat the problem as the criminal activity has become increasingly “extensive, pervasive, 
and sophisticated.” See Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 34, at 49–51 (testimony 
of Kelly L. Smith, Detective First Class, Howard County Police Department, Elicott City, 
Maryland) (noting difficulty in addressing the emerging presence of MS-13 because the 
gang “frequently migrate[s] to new communities that are not familiar with the threat that 
they pose”). 
83 See Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 34, at 40–44 (testimony of Stephen 
C. Johnson, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America, the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis 
Institute for International Studies, the Heritage Foundation). The increased removal of 
criminal gang members has failed to curb the growth of gangs because removed criminals 
are simply reentering rural communities and reoffending. See Deportees in Latin America, 
supra note 1, at 58–59 (statement of Marsha L. Garst, Commonwealth’s Attorney, Rocking-
ham County, Virginia) (stating a need for change in immigration policy “to assure that our 
communities are safe from the illegal-alien serial offenders”); Egley & O’Donnell, supra 
note 67, at 2. For example, Harrisonburg, Virginia has seen an explosion of gang activity. 
See Deportees in Latin America, supra note 1, at 59 (statement of Marsha L. Garst, Common-
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gang activity throughout the United States is a direct byproduct of cur-
rent immigration removal policy.84 
 The failure of this policy as a crime control measure extends be-
yond the United States and has had major consequences internation-
ally.85 Central American nations receiving criminals from the United 
States experience numerous problems such as harsh, inefficient over-
enforcement policies that create a culture of fear and violence and 
threaten the stability of Central American governments.86 Beyond in-
undating unstable Central American nations with criminals, the United 
States has failed to provide adequate support to or coordination with 
the receiving countries.87 Thus, criminal removals have simply shifted 
                                                                                                                      
wealth’s Attorney, Rockingham County, Virginia). In 2005, the community had 10 gangs 
and over 100 gang members; by 2007, the city had 25 active gangs with over 450 gang 
members. See id. Moreover, there were two cases in 2007 where “gang members were ar-
rested, deported, and then reentered the . . . community to reoffend.” See id. 
84 See Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 34, at 39–41 (testimony of Stephen 
C. Johnson, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America, the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis 
Institute for International Studies, the Heritage Foundation); Reisman, supra note 45, at 
149–50; Lopez et al., supra note 5. 
85 See Violence in Central America, supra note 30, at 21 (statement of Rep. Eliot L. Engel, 
Chairman, H. Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere) (noting that various governments have 
criticized the U.S. deportation strategy for thwarting international efforts to reduce gang 
membership and violence); Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 34, at 36 (state-
ment of Rep. Barbara Lee, Comm. on Int’l Relations) (suggesting the IIRIRA has had “a 
negative effect on these [receiving] countries, due to the expanded and retroactive depor-
tation standards”); see also Deportees in Latin America, supra note 1, at 1–2 (statement of Rep. 
Eliot L. Engel, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere) (“Displacement of that 
many people is bound to have repercussions that must be dealt with.”). 
86 See Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 34, at 60–62 (prepared statement of 
Manuel Orozco, Senior Associate, Inter-American Dialogue); Thale et al., supra note 6, at 
5; Sibaja et al., supra note 22, at 49; see also No Place to Hide, supra note 6, at 50 (“The 
rapid growth in the power and prevalence of Salvadoran street gangs . . . in El Salvador in 
the 1990s resulted in part from major shifts in U.S. immigration laws during that decade 
. . . .”). In El Salvador, the detrimental effect of gang activity “obstructs economic progress 
and democratic social development.” Sibaja et al., supra note 22, at 47, 51–53. Gang vio-
lence costs the country approximately 11.5% of its gross domestic product annually and 
“contributes to deterred trade and investment.” See id. at 47–48. Gang activity is also influ-
encing policy decisions and affecting democratic stability because hard-line government 
responses have diverted resources from other social issues. See id. at 49; Reisman, supra 
note 45, at 149 (“Because they have had to channel a disproportionate percentage of their 
scarce resources into security, the governments of the region have continually and consis-
tently short-changed social investment.”). Discriminatory tactics, extra-judicial violence, 
and media stigmatization has all led to a pervading sense of insecurity and instability in the 
country. See No Place to Hide, supra note 6, at vii–ix; Thale et al., supra note 6, at 3; 
Sibaja et al., supra note 22, at 47–49. 
87 See Deportees in Latin America, supra note 1, at 35–39 (statements of Annemarie Barnes, 
Chief Technical Director, Ministry of National Security, Jamaica, and Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee, 
Member, H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs); Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 34, at 
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the burden to these nations, to the detriment of both the United States 
and the global community.88 
III. Political Economic Theory Analysis 
 With the understanding that the large-scale removal of gang 
members has fueled the proliferation of transnational gangs, a new ap-
proach to the problem is required.89 Political economic theory may of-
fer some insights on how to chart that new course.90 Political economic 
theory suggests that criminal activity will shift to where the “expected 
criminal payoff” is most profitable.91 In other words, criminal activity 
moves in reaction to cost-imposing regulation and legislation that 
makes crime less lucrative.92 This economic analysis suggests that effec-
tive crime control must impose significant legal costs and sanctions that 
criminals will consider as major factors when deciding where to commit 
crimes.93 In theory, costs and sanctions will force criminal activity to 
countries where expected sanctions are lowest.94 
 Tomer Broude and Doron Teichman, two professors who recently 
examined political economic crime control, have concluded that 
“crime control policies adopted by individual states influence the global 
distribution of crime and subsequently impact the crime control poli-
                                                                                                                      
41 (statement of Stephen C. Johnson, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America, the Kathryn 
and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, the Heritage Foundation). For 
example, in 2008, the United States provided less than thirty-two million dollars in foreign 
aid to El Salvador. See Seelke & Meyer, supra note 26, at 5. In contrast, the United States 
spent over seventy-three million dollars in 2007 for the costs of charted aircraft flights used in 
deportations to Central and South America. See Deportees in Latin America, supra note 1, at 27 
(written response from Gary Mead, Assistant Director for Management, Office of Detention 
& Removal Operations, United States Department of Homeland Security). 
88 See Deportees in Latin America, supra note 1, at 65 (statement of Rep. Yvette D. Clarke) 
(explaining that the United States places receiving countries in a “very difficult and ex-
pensive position to cope with an influx of offenders”); Thale et al., supra note 6, at 3. 
89 See Deportees in Latin America, supra note 1, at 35 (statement of Rep. Sheila Jackson 
Lee, Member, H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs); Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 
34, at 41 (statement of Stephen C. Johnson, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America, the 
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, the Heritage Founda-
tion); No Place to Hide, supra note 6, at 52–53. 
90 See Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 801. 
91 See id.; see also Michael Woodiwiss, Gangster Capitalism: The United States 
and the Global Rise of Organized Crime 20, 112–13 (2005) (“[T]he chance to make 
large illegal profits with minimal risks encourages organized crime.”). 
92 See Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 801. 
93 See id. at 807 (noting that criminals commit a crime “only if . . . its benefits outweigh 
its costs”). 
94 See id. at 801 (“[I]f the expected sanction in one jurisdiction rises, some crime from 
that jurisdiction will shift to areas in which the sanction is lower.”). 
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cies adopted by other states.”95 Broude and Teichman point out two 
major approaches to crime control.96 In one approach, national gov-
ernments can adopt lenient crime control policies to attract crime that 
generates economic benefits.97 In the other approach, governments 
“outsource” crime by imposing harsher sanctions expected to “shift and 
displace crimes to other jurisdictions.”98 Although outsourcing has the 
benefit of pushing crime to other countries, it also creates an “arms 
race” in which nations compete with one another to have the harshest 
crime control policies in an effort to repel crime and shift the burdens 
to other nations.99 The resulting regulatory competition has been criti-
cized as detrimental to transnational crime control efforts.100 
A. U.S. Removal Policy Has Triggered Regulatory Competition 
 U.S. removal policy has created a prime example of this kind of 
regulatory competition.101 The United States and the Central American 
nations that receive deported criminals, most notably El Salvador, are 
engaged in an outsourcing race that fuels the transnationalization of 
youth gangs.102 In the past, El Salvador could have been characterized as 
an insourcing nation that attracted criminal activity with a lack of sanc-
tions and minimal legal costs.103 In contrast, the United States increas-
                                                                                                                      
95 See id. at 826–27. 
96 See id. at 800. 
97 See Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 800. An example of a crime that generates 
economic benefits is human trafficking. See Stephanie L. Mariconda, Note, Breaking the 
Chains: Combating Human Trafficking at the State Level, 29 B.C. Third World L.J. 151, 165 
(2009). Many developing countries depend on human trafficking to “flourish” and “im-
plicitly condone” the activity by either not enforcing the law or not criminalizing the act. 
See id. 
98 See Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 800, 807 (discussing the effect of “legal 
costs” on criminal behavior). 
99 See id. at 800, 812. 
100 See id. at 827–31 (noting that there are “those who argue that regulatory competi-
tion is inefficient” and, on the other side of the debate are those who “agitate[] against 
international harmonization”). 
101 See No Place to Hide, supra note 6, at 107–66; Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, 
at 800; Chacón, supra note 2, at 352; Reisman, supra note 45, at 147; Lopez et al., supra 
note 5. 
102 See Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 800; Reisman, supra note 45, at 147 (ex-
plaining that youth gang violence is exacerbated by countries enacting policies in their 
self-interest that “both explicitly and implicitly impact other countries in the region, thus 
establishing a vicious cycle of violence that is difficult to stem”). 
103 See No Place to Hide, supra note 6, at 53–56; Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, 
at 814–15 (noting that Central American nations “may have in the past generally consid-
ered gang activity . . . desirable or tolerable”); Nagle, supra note 5, at 16; Reisman, supra 
note 45, at 149, 151. 
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ingly combats gang violence by strengthening crime control policies in 
an effort to outsource crime.104 While there may have been a previous 
symbiotic relationship between the United States, an outsourcing na-
tion, and El Salvador, an insourcing nation, recent policy changes un-
dertaken by both nations have led to an ineffective model of regulatory 
competition that is detrimental to international crime control.105 
 The IIRIRA increased the removal of criminal noncitizens which, 
in turn, greatly affected the crime control policies in Central Amer-
ica.106 El Salvador was unprepared for the influx of criminal gang mem-
bers that resulted from U.S. removals and overcompensated in its re-
sponse, creating a backlash.107 El Salvador enacted the repressive mano 
dura policies as a reactive response to U.S. deportations and as the first 
step in an outsourcing race with the United States.108 By implementing 
harsh sanctions, El Salvador quickly transformed from an insourcing 
nation to an outsourcing nation.109 Thus, there has been an observable 
shift in the traditional regulatory dynamic, as El Salvador has become 
an outsourcing nation competing with the United States for the harsh-
est crime control policies.110 
 The result of this backlash is that El Salvador has increased its 
crime control policies to the point where they exceed the sanctions im-
                                                                                                                      
104 See Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 814–15 (noting that the U.S. deportation 
policy “exports” gang members to their home nation). See generally IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (broadening the 
grounds of removal for criminal noncitizens). 
105 See Deportees in Latin America, supra note 1, at 38 (statement of Annemarie Barnes, 
Chief Technical Director, Ministry of National Security, Jamaica); Gangs and Crime in Latin 
America, supra note 34, at 17 (testimony of Chris Swecker, Assistant Director, Criminal In-
vestigation Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation); Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, 
at 814–15 (the influx of gang members returned to Central America has caused the receiv-
ing nations to cease considering gang activity as desirable); Chacón, supra note 2, at 352–
56; Reisman, supra note 45, at 148–49. 
106 See Thale et al., supra note 6, at 4–5; Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 814–
15; Chacón, supra note 2, at 352–56. 
107 See Thale et al., supra note 6, at 3 (noting that Central American governments re-
sponded to the increase in youth gang violence with repressive policing strategies); Reis-
man, supra note 45, at 149 (“[T]he resource-strapped Central American countries have 
little to no capacity to deal adequately with the influx of gang members.”). 
108 See Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 812; see also Thale et al., supra note 6, at 
3; Chacón, supra note 2, at 352–56. 
109 See No Place to Hide, supra note 6, at 107–66; Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, 
at 814–15. 
110 See Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 814–15. 
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posed by the United States.111 The mano dura response and its strong-
arm and oppressive tactics are forcing gang members back into the 
United States to conduct criminal activity.112 The United States’ reli-
ance on deportations as a criminal control tactic is therefore “not an 
effective means of achieving either deterrence or incapacitation within 
the crime control context.”113 
 While the United States has not become an insourcing nation—its 
policies do not aim to attract criminal activity—it is losing the outsourc-
ing race with El Salvador.114 One explanation for why the removal pol-
icy is losing to El Salvador’s mano dura policies is that removal simply 
does not increase a gang’s cost of doing business in the United 
States.115 Gang members do not voluntarily move from the United 
States to Central America because it is more profitable for them to op-
erate there.116 Rather, criminals relocate because they are physically 
removed from one location to the other.117 Thus, criminal activity may 
not actually move in reaction to cost-imposing regulation.118 
 The U.S. removal policy does not provide strict sanctions nor im-
pose costs that make crime less lucrative within its borders.119 Deporta-
tion is not a working deterrent, as evidenced by the large number of 
                                                                                                                      
111 See No Place to Hide, supra note 6, at 107–66 (providing an overview of El Salva-
dor’s government response to gang violence); Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 814–
15; Lopez et al., supra note 5. 
112 See Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 814–15; Lopez et al., supra note 5 (“[H]arsh 
police reactions in Central America [are] . . . pushing more and more gang members . . . 
toward the U.S., according to law enforcement officials and gang members.”). 
113 See Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 814–15; Chacón, supra note 14, at 1879, 
1888. 
114 See Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 812, 815; Chacón, supra note 2, at 321–27; 
Kraul et al., supra note 15 (“Now, law enforcement crackdowns in Honduras and El Salva-
dor are helping reverse the flow.”). 
115 See Deportees in Latin America, supra note 1, at 8 (statement of Rep. Dan Burton, 
Chairman, H. Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere) (stating that one failing of the U.S. de-
portation policy is that many removed gang members simply come back into the United 
States); Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 807; Chacón, supra note 14, at 1879, 1888; 
Chacón, supra note 2, at 352; Lopez et al., supra note 5. 
116 See No Place to Hide, supra note 6, at 51–53. 
117 See id. Thus, U.S outsourcing could be described as mechanical or artificial because 
the movement of criminals out of the country is not the result of regulatory outsourcing in 
the traditional sense. See Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 807 (basing their model of 
regulatory outsourcing on economic considerations and motivations). 
118 See Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 807. 
119 See Chacón, supra note 14, at 1888. Rather, after removal, “the locus of their crimi-
nal activity simply shifts” without addressing the willingness of gang members to commit 
future crimes in the United States. See id. 
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deportees who return to the United States and reoffend.120 The in-
crease in gang membership and crime in the United States since the 
IIRIRA’s passage illustrates that the threat of removal does not make 
the United States a less desirable location for gang activity.121 
B. Regulatory Cooperation as a Possible Solution 
 One of the factors in the domestic growth of youth gangs is the 
movement of gang members to the United States because it may be the 
more desirable—and profitable—location for criminal activity.122 While 
there is no easy solution to the growing global gang phenomenon, it 
has become clear that forced removals have only exacerbated the prob-
lem.123 National and international gang activity and membership are 
currently at higher rates than when the legislative reform was imple-
mented in 1996 to combat gang problems.124 Yet, even in the face of 
                                                                                                                      
120 See Deportees in Latin America, supra note 1, at 8 (statement of Rep. Dan Burton, 
Chairman, H. Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere). In 2007, over thirty thousand nonciti-
zens were re-apprehended in the United States after being formally removed to their 
home countries. See id. at 77 (written responses from Gary Mead, Assistant Director for 
Management, Office of Detention & Removal Operations, United States Department of 
Homeland Security). Additionally, in a survey of three hundred deportees removed to El 
Salvador in 2002, twenty-three percent stated that they had already been deported once 
before from the United States and thirty-eight percent said they were planning to return. 
See id. at 48–50 (statement of Nestor Rodriguez, Chairman, Department of Sociology, Uni-
versity of Houston). 
121 See Egley & O’Donnell, supra note 67, at 1–2; see also Deportees in Latin America, su-
pra note 1, at 38 (statement of Annemarie Barnes, Chief Technical Director, Ministry of 
National Security, Jamaica) (“[T]he removal of criminal offenders to another geographical 
location does not protect the United States from further criminal actions by those per-
sons.”); Chacón, supra note 14, at 1888 (“[R]emoved noncitizens . . . are not likely to cease 
[criminal] conduct simply because they have been removed.”); Chacón, supra note 2, at 
352–56; Lopez et al., supra note 5 (quoting Federal Bureau of Investigation Assistant Direc-
tor Chris Swecker on the end result of deporting gang members: “‘I think most of the po-
lice departments will agree that you’re just getting them off the street for a couple of 
months.’”). 
122 See Deportees in Latin America, supra note 1, at 8 (statement of Rep. Dan Burton, 
Chairman, H. Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere); Thale et al., supra note 6, at 4 (“As 
migration between the U.S. and the region continues to surge, the connections and influ-
ences between the gangs in each country have only become stronger.”); Broude & Teich-
man, supra note 18, at 807–08. 
123 See Deportees in Latin America, supra note 1, at 1(statement of Rep. Eliot L. Engel, 
Chairman, H. Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere); Reisman, supra note 45, at 148–50 (not-
ing that this gang removal policy has had a complex impact on the United States and Cen-
tral America, including the proliferation of youth gangs throughout the region). 
124 See Immigration and the Alien Gang Epidemic, supra note 67, at 13 (statement of Heather 
Mac Donald, Senior Fellow, the Manhattan Institute); Egley, supra note 66, at 1–2; Egley & 
O’Donnell, supra note 67, at 1–2; Reisman, supra note 45, at 148–50. 
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failed results, the U.S approach remains wrongly focused on deporta-
tion and increasing removal efforts.125 
 Legislative efforts to harden our criminal removal tactics further 
are not the solution.126 Several problems might result if the United 
States takes a more drastic approach to gang-related crime.127 First, such 
an approach would increase self-serving regulatory competition.128 It 
would lead to a system of crime prevention which would not account for 
the collective international impact of gang crime.129 Second, regulatory 
competition has proven to be ineffective as a crime reduction me-
thod.130 Rather than limit gang activity, deportations create a “merry-go-
round” without borders, enabling the movement and transnational 
spread of MS-13.131 The failure of the current U.S. removal policy in re-
ducing gang crime is an example of the trouble that can result from a 
                                                                                                                      
125 See Alien Gang Removal Act of 2005, H.R. 2933, 109th Cong. (2005); Thale et al., 
supra note 6, at 4 (discussing the Alien Gang Removal Act as an example of stronger de-
portation legislation). Such proposed legislation would provide broader definitions of 
gang crimes in an effort to strengthen and expand U.S. deportations. See Alien Gang Re-
moval Act of 2005: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec., and Claims of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 11–12 (2005) (statement of Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee, 
Member, H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs) (noting that the Alien Gang Removal Act would 
allow individuals to be deported for “being a member of a group or association of three or 
more individuals that have been designated by the Attorney General as a criminal street 
gang”). Recently proposed legislation mirrors the repressive mano dura policies in many 
ways and would also increase the possibility of innocent and legally present individuals 
being deported. See Chacón, supra note 2, at 333–36. 
126 See Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 34, at 3 (statement of Rep. Dan Bur-
ton, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere) (“[W]e must also rethink what we 
do with illegal immigrants . . . once we catch them . . . . Simply exporting our problems 
obviously is not the solution.”); Thale et al., supra note 6, at 4 (“Some in the United 
States have proposed a still stronger emphasis on deportation, as a way to get criminals out 
of the United States.”); Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 807–08. 
127 See Thale et al., supra note 6, at 4 (“Increasingly aggressive deportation policies 
are likely to further strengthen the transnational links between gangs in Central America 
and in the United States and to worsen the problems in the region.”); Broude & Teich-
man, supra note 18, at 828; Reisman, supra note 45, at 147 (advocating that governments 
should work together in developing enforcement policies in order to end the cycle of inef-
fective state responses). 
128 See Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 830–31 (stating that independent “crime 
control efforts” of one nation displace criminal activity to other nations, creating “negative 
externalities”). 
129 See id. at 831 (noting that when nations engage in regulatory competition it can 
lead to “suboptimal crime control policies that do not maximize aggregate welfare”). 
130 See Deportees in Latin America, supra note 1, 34–35 (statements of Rep. Sheila Jackson 
Lee, Member, H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, and Rep. William D. Delahunt, Member, H. 
Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere) (noting the failure of current U.S. deportation policy as a 
crime control measure). 
131 See Sibaja et al., supra note 22, at 45; see also Lopez et al., supra note 5. 
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regulatory competition that ignores international impact.132 Finally, a 
race to the strictest sanctions may threaten civil liberties, especially for 
underrepresented groups.133 This is already evidenced by the discrimi-
natory practices implemented in El Salvador.134 The United States has 
also shown recent willingness to compromise constitutional rights in an 
effort to toughen immigration policy and combat gang crime.135 Thus, 
continuing to engage in regulatory competition will only exacerbate the 
problems resulting from the already decentralized international system 
of crime control.136 
 It is time to accept the failure of U.S. removal policy and create 
new ways for immigration law to combat criminal gangs.137 While con-
crete solutions do not present themselves readily, political economic 
theory suggests that international cooperation will provide the most 
beneficial path to alleviate the problem of gang proliferation.138 Rather 
than compete with Central American nations, the United States and 
the international community must take a cooperative approach in con-
trolling the proliferation of youth gangs.139 The United States needs to 
                                                                                                                      
132 See Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 830–31; Chacón, supra note 14, at 1888 
(noting that the U.S. removal policy does not “trouble itself” with the consequences for 
nations receiving the gang members). 
133 See Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 831 (“[D]ecentralization brings about in-
equalities that benefit wealthier groups.”). Nations that engage in regulatory competition 
often adopt harsher sanctions and policies than necessary. See id. at 831, 835. 
134 See Thale et al., supra note 6, at 3; Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 831 (not-
ing that outsourcing races lead to inefficiencies associated with over-enforcement); Reis-
man, supra note 45, at 148. 
135 See Chacón, supra note 2, at 331–36. For example, one federal task force focused on 
noncitizen gang activity is able to remove noncitizens believed to be gang members even 
when state and federal law may provide no basis for criminal prosecution. See id. at 332 
(“[Seventy] percent of the people removed [by this task force] have not been charged with 
crimes and are deported on the grounds of immigration violations alone.”). By identifying 
gang members without any legal standards, this task force depends on discretionary polic-
ing, which leads to concerns of abusive law enforcement. See id. at 332–33, 341–42. Addi-
tionally, there are few procedural checks to ensure abuse does not take place because 
there is no legal process to challenge this type of removal. See id. 
136 See Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 830–31. In the current decentralized sys-
tem, nations make independent and self-serving policy decisions that displace crime to 
other nations, leading to over-enforcement and inefficient crime control. See Reisman, 
supra note 45, at 147. 
137 See Deportees in Latin America, supra note 1, at 35 (statement of Rep. Sheila Jackson 
Lee, Member, H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs). 
138 See Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 801. 
139 See Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 34, at 13 (prepared statement of 
Adolfo A. Franco, Assistant Administrator, Bureau of Latin America and the Caribbean, 
United States Agency for International Development) (“[B]y working together with other 
governments and other U.S. government agencies to implement effective cross-sectoral 
measures that strengthen institutions and build local capacity, we can—and must—have an 
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work with other nations to implement actual laws and legal costs that 
no longer make any location a profitable place for criminal activity.140 
Through international cooperation, the nations of the Americas can 
develop new forms of international crime control to combat the rising 
gang problem and avoid inefficient regulatory competition.141 
 The proliferation of youth gangs is a transnational problem that 
requires a coordinated transnational response.142 The United States 
and Central American nations that have been inundated with removed 
criminals must work together to implement uniform crime control 
standards that are in the best interests of the international commu-
nity.143 While a model for this level of international cooperation does 
not currently exist and may be difficult to achieve, it is necessary to un-
derstand that it is the best approach to combating gang proliferation.144 
A first step might be the formation of an international committee to 
provide benchmark standards of enforcement and sanction.145 This 
“cooperative-outsourcing” approach will provide many advantages over 
regulatory competition.146 International crime control standards will 
                                                                                                                      
impact.”); Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 837 (recommending international nor-
mative regimes designed to increase the efficiency of crime control); Reisman, supra note 
45, at 147. 
140 See Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 34, at 3, 13 (statement of Rep. Dan 
Burton, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere, and prepared statement of Adolfo 
A. Franco, Assistant Administrator, Bureau of Latin America and the Caribbean, United 
States Agency for International Development); Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 800, 
807. To make criminal activity unprofitable, the United States should not blindly increase its 
sanctions; instead it must focus on international cooperation. See Thale et al., supra note 6, 
at 4; Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 837; Reisman, supra note 45, at 147. As part of an 
international approach, the United States should, as others have called for, provide monetary 
aid and other resources to help improve the law enforcement response of the Central Ameri-
can nations. See Deportees in Latin America, supra note 1, at 35–36, 38 (statements of Rep. Sheila 
Jackson Lee, Member, H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, and Annemarie Barnes, Chief Techni-
cal Director, Ministry of National Security, Jamaica) (recommending increased aid for social 
reintegration programs and increased support for receiving nations’ law enforcement). 
141 See Gangs and Crime in Latin America, supra note 34, at 13 (prepared statement of Adol-
fo A. Franco, Assistant Administrator, Bureau of Latin America and the Caribbean, United 
States Agency for International Development); Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 848 
(“[T]he traditional concept of state sovereignty over criminal justice must make way for new 
concepts of international cooperation if efficient crime control is to be achieved.”). 
142 See Reisman, supra note 45, at 147, 151. 
143 See Broude & Teichman, supra note 18, at 836 (stating that internationally agreed-
upon “maximum criminal standards” would allow for optimal crime control without impos-
ing externalities on other nations and without wasting resources). 
144 See id. at 835–37. 
145 See id. at 838. 
146 See id. at 848. 
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ensure that criminal activity will not be negatively displaced and will 
lead to the most internationally efficient crime control regulations.147 
Conclusion 
 U.S legislation that focuses on deporting noncitizen gang mem-
bers and the harsh policy response from Central American nations has 
contributed to rather than eliminated transnational gang violence. Ra-
ther than engage in such regulatory competition, the United States 
should work to develop an internationally cooperative model for regu-
lating criminal gang activity. While the United States must implement 
new regulations that deter crime by imposing sanctions that make the 
United States a more costly and less desirable place to conduct criminal 
activity, any new legislation must be a part of a coordinated interna-
tional crime control effort. The United States must develop new inter-
national strategies with Central American nations to avoid overburden-
ing them with the influx of criminal gang members and to combat the 
threat of gang transnationalization most efficiently. 
                                                                                                                      
147 See id. at 830–31, 836 (suggesting that enforcement-related externalities and ineffi-
ciencies could result from the absence of centralized international crime control). For 
example, if engaged in an outsourcing race, El Salvador could not afford to relax its cur-
rent repressive enforcement tactics because to do so would cause even more crime to be 
displaced from the United States. See id. at 835. A cooperative crime control effort between 
the nations, however, would avoid this inefficient regulatory competition and allow nations 
to adopt policies that are mutually beneficial. See id. at 835–36. 
